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Abstract 
The paper examines recent evidence on the erosion of the German industrial relations model. 
Although its coverage has declined, much of this has occurred in smaller and newer 
establishments, and compared with Britain, it has remained solid in the areas of Germany's 
traditional industrial strength. This is explained by the nature of high performance work 
systems that involve flexible working and on-the-job problem-solving. Both countries have 
modernised their work systems in recent decades, with German industrial firms maintaining 
higher degrees of worker autonomy and learning and British ones relying more on managerial 
control. The survival of the German model in this sector, as compared with services, is 
attributed to the role of such work systems in the high end of international competition. A 
model is developed to explain why stable cooperation within these work relationships is 
enhanced by means of a strong institutional framework. It is then used to explain why 
employers in the sectors using these systems have continued to work within these institutions. 
It is argued that employers’ increased focus on the match between commercial needs and 
workplace institutions has contributed to the growing segmentation within German industrial 
relations which has been widely documented, and represents a departure from the classical 
post-war German model. The article finishes by asking how far this can go before damaging 
social and political cohesion. 
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1. Introduction1 
German industrial relations have passed through several major challenges in the last quarter 
of a century which have caused significant changes in the three pillars of the post-war model: 
coordinated bargaining, workplace codetermination and skill formation. Some observers ask 
whether changes in its corporatist and encompassing features, which had characterised 
previous decades, mean that it is joining the 'Anglo-Saxon' fold of liberal market economies 
as it seeks to compete in global markets (Der Spiegel, 1999). Others ask whether what Streeck 
(2004) described as 'beneficial constraints' have lost their bite. Instead of being collectively 
forced to adopt the path of high productivity and high wages, it is claimed that many German 
employers can now sidestep them whenever they have suitable outside options, such those 
arising from deregulation of domestic labour markets, as with the Hartz reforms, or from the 
opening up of opportunities for off-shoring to cheaper locations, such as in Eastern Europe. In 
this article, I argue that the German model has evolved in a way that reflects its distinctive 
economic strengths, compared with other similarly developed economies such as Britain. 
'Erosion' has primarily occurred in areas to which the model extended for reasons of social 
inclusiveness and workplace democracy. In contrast, it has been maintained in sectors where 
it contributes to Germany's comparative industrial advantage. Ironically, these have often 
been engaged in international supply chains facilitated by opportunities in Eastern Europe. In 
particular, I argue that in sectors where the 'learning model'
2
 of skill and knowledge 
development has been of growing importance, codetermination continues to provide an 
effective institutional framework, and that there, employers have found it is in their interest to 
retain it. Erosion has occurred primarily in activities where simpler models of management 
control are both effective and cheaper to operate. 
 
Since 1990, pressures on employers to re-evaluate their commitment to the classical German 
model have greatly increased. The progressive completion of the Single European Market, 
coupled with reduced barriers to international trade globally, have forced changes in industrial 
relations and human resource practices across the EU. In Germany, these challenges were 
intensified by the fiscal burden of Reunification in 1990, which increased costs and may have 
contributed to Germany's 'lost decade' of slow growth during the 1990s, when its economy 
grew only half as fast as those of the UK and the US.
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 However, Reunification and the 
opening up of Eastern Europe, also brought new opportunities, and opened up a new 'outside 
option', which it has been argued enabled employers to side-step former 'beneficial 
constraints' (Meardi et al., 2013). This opened up possibilities to renew historic connections 
with the less regulated transition economies of Eastern Europe, and increased access to their 
often highly trained but cheaper labour, which rivalled that in former West Germany (Hancké 
and Kurekova, 2008). As in other countries, German industrial relations have been tested by a 
series of revolutions in production systems, from its own high-skilled version of taylorism in 
the 1970s, through diversified quality, lean, and modular production to integration in global 
value chains (Jürgens, 2004), as well as a shift towards more knowledge intensive activities, 
often based on network- rather than establishment-based patterns of organisation (e.g. 
Baumann, 2003, Sydow and Staber, 2002).  
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Associated with these pressures, there has been a growing internal diversity and increased 
segmentation within the German post-war model, accelerated by the Hartz labour market 
reforms (eg. Eichhorst, 2014; Hassel, 2014; Jürgens et al 2006; Kirchner et al. 2012, 2014 ; 
Palier and Thelen, 2010). A notable watershed was the defeat of the metal workers' union, IG 
Metall, in 2003 and the so-called Pforzheim Agreement of February 2004. This facilitated 
further development of local concessions on the terms of industry agreements in order to 
defend jobs.
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 According to Streeck (2009: 53) it gave works councils an 'effective veto over 
union policy'. Although presented at the time as a practical measure to save jobs, the 
agreement has been widely regarded as a major defeat for the union, opening the way for 
greater segmentation as weaker firms would be the ones to take advantage of its provisions 
(Silva, 2013: 353).  
 
I hope to contribute to this debate by using elements of the British experience to consider an 
alternative path that German firms might have taken, but chose not to, in activities where 
high-skilled production and cooperative workplace institutions continue to confer a 
comparative advantage. I shall argue that, since the 1980s, both Germany and Britain have 
had to transform work organisation in response to technical and competitive changes, and that 
Germany's stronger skill base and stronger workplace institutions have enabled many firms 
located there to pursue a high-discretion learning model of work organisation, compared with 
a more managerially directed lean model in Britain.
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 The outcome is that in these activities 
German firms have been very successful in sustaining a high skilled input in international 
supply chains. Increased competitive pressures on firms in both Germany and Britain have led 
to a retreat of the classical industrial relations models in other sectors where employers felt 
they did not confer a competitive advantage given the nature and organisation of their 
production and service systems. Hence the shrinking inclusiveness and growing 
'segmentalism'. To develop the argument, I outline a model of flexible employment 
relationships in which employers can benefit from both adaptive working and on-the-job 
problem-solving and learning, but to do so, they need to develop high-trust work 
relationships. These are favoured by institutional guarantees to workers, such as those 
provided by codetermination, as evidenced by the empirical studies showing, mostly, 
beneficial effects of works councils (see Jirjahn, 2010). Because both parties take 
considerable risks when setting aside protective work rules, flexible cooperation is not always 
stable, and without strong institutional support, there is always a danger that such rules will 
revert to more restrictive application when trust comes under strain. These cooperative 
relationships are costly, so that employers are likely to be more interested in developing and 
sustaining them when the economic benefits are most valued, such as in order to maintain 
their position in competitive supply chains. The retreat of the classical German model from 
other types of work place raises serious questions about social inclusion and workplace 
democracy, as argued by the 2006 Commission on the Modernisation of Codetermination 
(Kommission, 2006). Unfortunately these extend beyond the limits of this short paper, 
nevertheless, they need to be recognised, and some potential risks are considered in the 
conclusion. 
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2. Contemporary challenges 
Given the scale of contemporary challenges, it is not surprising that the roots of current 
changes in the German industrial relations model can be traced back over many years. Hassel 
(1999) showed that two of the model's three pillars, works council presence and coverage by 
industry wage agreements had begun to decline before 1990, and after Reunification, eroded 
further. The trends she analysed have continued. In Germany as a whole, between 2000 and 
2010, the share of employees covered by industry or firm agreements declined from 66% to 
57%, and in former West Germany, from 69% to 60% 
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 (Addison et al. 2012). This decline in 
coverage has also been reflected in union and employer organisation membership (Streeck 
2009: Ch. 3). The share of employees covered by works councils in former West Germany 
also declined: from 50% to 46% (2000-2007). There has been an increasing share of councils 
operating outside both company and wage agreements, and a growth of firms with neither 
council nor wage agreement, up from one fifth to almost one third (Ellguth and Kohaut, 
2013). In former East Germany, where the institutions were less securely established, the 
erosion was deeper. Restructuring and outsourcing by business organisations have also been 
argued to generate a form of 'vertical disintegration' (Doellgast, 2009). Many similar long-
term changes have occurred in Britain. From the late 1980s, the decline in union membership 
density has followed a similar path in both countries. In Britain too, the share of employees 
covered by collective agreements has declined: overall from 70% in 1984, down to 39% by 
2004, and in the private sector from 52% to 25%
7
 (Brown, Bryson and Forth 2009: Table 2.2).  
 
Behind the general retreat of collective regulation has been what some observers, such as 
Thelen (2009), speak of as a growing 'segmentalism' in the place of the formerly inclusive 
models. Thus in Germany, the fall in bargaining coverage has been concentrated among small 
establishments: between 2000 and 2010 it fell from 54% to 41% of employees among 
establishments with 5-49 employees, compared with 89% to 84% among those with at least 
250 employees (Addison et al. 2012).
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 Works council coverage is also much lower in small 
than in large workplaces (Kohaut and Ellguth, 2008: in former West Germany in 2007, 
coverage was 10% in establishments with 5-49 employees, compared with 90% in those with 
over 500 employees, and 42% overall). Another aspect of this segmentalism is that, in both 
countries, a substantial part of the decline of collective representation has been associated 
with the difficulty of organising new establishments, which also tend to be smaller, rather 
than with loss of representation in older establishments. Jirjahn (2009) observes that firms' 
changes in works council status are infrequent. Similarly, for Britain, Machin (2000) showed 
the decline in coverage was due less to de-recognition in established workplaces than to the 
reluctance of new ones to accept unions. 
 
The third pillar of the classical German model is provided by vocational training, and notably 
the apprenticeship system, which, since the 1960s, has been much stronger than in Britain. 
There similar reforms to those introduced in Germany to raise training quality had caused 
costs to rise, and triggered a prolonged decline despite a number of public policy initiatives to 
reverse it (Marsden, 1995, Steedman 1998). More recently this form of vocational training has 
also come under strain in Germany. Hillmert (2008) has argued that its former virtues have 
become obstacles to change, notably in relation to the expansion of service employment and 
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of higher education. It used to provide the foundation for both promotion within large-firm 
internal labour markets, and mobility between small and medium firms across occupational 
markets (Lutz et al., 2007). Yet, the steady long-term expansion of higher education graduates 
in recent decades has eroded the internal promotion opportunities for those with intermediate 
vocational skills, apparently confirming concerns about skilled-worker careers raised earlier 
by Drexel (1993). On the small firm side, Lutz et al (2007) ask whether there has been too 
much focus on the internal labour markets of large industrial firms, with a consequent neglect 
of the role of apprenticeship in sustaining inter-firm occupational markets. Similarly, 
Culpepper and Thelen (2008) argue that the cost and sophistication of apprenticeship are 
focused primarily on 'the demands of Germany's largest and technologically most advanced 
manufacturing exporters' (p. 43), hence its problems in small firms and service employment. 
Thus squeezed from above and below, partial erosion of this pillar appears to be reflected in 
the number of young people entering university that now surpasses those entering 
apprenticeship (Baethge and Wolter, 2014). 
 
Take in: Figure 1. Strictness of employment protection in Germany and the UK 1990-2013 
 
Workers' individual bargaining power is often a neglected part of the picture of worker 
representation. Yet it can play a very important role in regulating the employment 
relationship, and ensuring that workers get a fair deal from their employers, particularly over 
issues related to workloads and task assignments. It will be argued later that the articulation 
between individual and collective dealing with management plays a critical part in job 
regulation, and in particular, in the development of flexible work roles and on-the-job 
learning. For now, I focus on whether the decline in collective representation has been 
accompanied by a similar decline in workers' individual bargaining power. A worker's 
individual bargaining power compared to management is related to the latter’s ability to 
threaten dismissal as a pressure tactic, and substitute a new hire. Two rough indicators of this 
are the strictness of employment protection regulations, and the practice of hiring workers 
into long-term jobs. Despite the aggregate decline in collective regulation of employment 
relationships, the OECD's index of the strictness of formal employment protection rules has 
changed little in both countries over the period, remaining considerably stronger in Germany 
than in Britain (Figure 1)
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. The exception has been easing restrictions on the hiring of 
temporary workers in Germany, part of, but also predating the 2003-2005 Hartz reforms, 
which have led to increased hiring of workers on temporary and 'mini-job' contracts (Jacobi 
and Kluve, 2006). This is consistent with increased segmentalism in the German labour 
market. Turning to long-term jobs, falling job tenures could indicate weakening bonds 
between employer and employee, and potentially increased insecurity for workers, which was 
previously held in check by collective action. In Germany, despite the retreat of collective 
regulation of employment, and despite measures to liberalise labour markets, overall 
employee job tenures have remained remarkably stable for both women and men (Figure 2: 
upper panel). This stands in marked contrast to the decline in male job tenures in Britain over 
the same period, both overall, but also affecting early middle-aged men, aged 35-39, 
traditionally considered as the core labour force. It should be noted that the decline for British 
men is partly offset by an increase in women's tenures. However, a look at job tenures for 
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young German employees (aged 25-29: lower panel), compared with their elders, shows a 
decline since 1990, as their tenures have become more like those of their British counterparts. 
Several factors could lie behind this. Younger workers are more likely to be in temporary 
jobs, boosted by the Hartz reforms, and in new and small establishments where their 
individual bargaining power has less institutional support, which is consistent with increased 
segmentalism.  
 
Take in Figure 2 Long term jobs for selected age groups in Germany and the UK 1992-2012. 
 
Turning to the challenges of integration of large parts of manufacturing into global production 
systems, in both countries, the established models of employment relations in industry have 
faced similar pressures. However, a brief comparison of the manufacturing sectors, 
traditionally the heartland of organised industrial relations, in both Germany and the UK 
reveals some fascinating differences. In both countries, the employment share of 
manufacturing has fallen, but more steeply in Britain (respectively 22% to 18%, and 16% to 
10% for 1995-2008: OECD STAN tables). However, these common trends hide a very 
different trajectory for manufacturing production. German manufacturing firms have been 
very successful in repositioning themselves within international supply chains: participating 
fully in what has become known as the 'trade in tasks' (Eriksson, 2010). This can be seen in 
Figure 3, where the share of exports in manufacturing gross value added has climbed steeply 
in Germany, but only modestly in Britain. By the time of the 2008 financial crash, for German 
manufacturing, exports were 80% greater than value added: it was exporting much more than 
it was producing domestically.  In his book on competing in capabilities, Sutton (2012) argues 
that holding one's place in international supply chains is very competitive, requiring firms to 
attain the quality standards needed for the final product on the chain, while at the same time 
being innovative in managing process and cost improvements. It is a very different world 
from that envisaged by an earlier generation of Industrial Relations scholars for whom the 
workplace mostly transformed raw materials into final products. Herrigel (2014) provides a 
vivid illustration of this process.
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Arguably, employer confidence in workplace representative institutions is reflected in how far 
they are willing to work through them when seeking to adapt their businesses to changes in 
product markets such as those related to international supply chains. Reviewing the past two 
decades, Kotthoff (2013) observes that in many firms, works councils have played a key role  
as 'co-managers' in dealing with such issues, adapting by a process of 'cooperative 
modernisation'. Nevertheless, by doing so, these institutions came under great strain vis-à-vis 
their consitituents (Müller-Jentsch, 2013). In contrast, British employers appear to have been 
less willing to do so. Analysing the 25-year historical time series of the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys, Brown et al. (2009) found that since 1980 increased product 
market competition and engagement in international markets was associated with a greater 
than average decline in union coverage, suggesting that many British employers did not feel 
the need to work through collective institutions. An important clue to the importance of this 
difference can be found by comparing the nature of work systems in the two countries, and in 
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particular, the different institutional needs of the lean and learning models, which will be 
explained in the next section. 
 
 
Take in Figure 3. Manufacturing value added and exports in Germany and the UK 1995-2008 
3. Work systems in Germany and the UK.  
How have German work practices kept pace with these changes in a way that favours 
Germany's position within these supply chains? This section uses data from a representative 
survey of European households, the European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS), for 
1995-2010, and enables a contrast between work patterns and trends in major economic 
sectors in the two countries.
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 Drawing on the recent literature on work systems, Lorenz and 
Valeyre (2005), and Holm et al (2010) identify four ideal types of work systems, and assess 
their extent using the EWCS. The four types are ‘learning’, ‘lean’, ‘taylor’, and ‘craft/simple'. 
The distinguishing features of the learning model are employee problem-solving, on-the-job 
learning, job discretion, and autonomy. The link between these four dimensions has been 
established theoretically by Koike and Inoki (1990, see also Jürgens et al 1993, and 
Appelbaum et al 2000). Those of the lean model include team working, rotation, and some 
problem-solving but subject to stronger co-worker and managerial pressures. The taylor 
system is characterised by low job complexity, monotony, managerial pressures, and a low 
degree of worker engagement in problem-solving and learning activities. In contrast, the 
craft/simple model scores low on on-the-job learning but relatively highly on autonomy, and 
task diversity. Details of the questions used and how they load onto each work system are 
shown in the appendix. Although the EWCS is a survey of employees, derived from a sample 
of households, there are good reasons to believe that one may draw conclusions about the 
distribution of work systems that affect groups and not just individual employees. To test for 
this, the author regressed the typology of work systems on information from the respondents 
about human resource management practices in their workplaces, and notably, the type of pay 
system. This confirmed the presence of relationships between individual replies about work 
conditions and workplace practices of the kind predicted by Human Resource Management 
theory.
12
  
 
At the aggregate level, combining industry and services, the diffusion of these work systems 
in the two countries appears both to reflect the different more skilled starting point for 
Germany compared with Britain, and to show a parallel decline in learning-based work 
systems from the beginning of the period (Table 1). Many researchers on vocational training 
in the two countries have observed its strength in Germany relative to Britain (eg Steedman 
and Wagner 1989), but also noted the challenges of growing service employment and pressure 
of equity markets for quicker financial returns (Culpepper, 1999). Nevertheless, a strong 
foundation in intermediate skills provides an effective basis for use of the 'learning' model in 
Germany (44% for all years combined, against 32% in Britain), whereas a weaker platform of 
intermediate skills in Britain constrains employers to use the lean and taylor models 
(respectively 38% and 15%, against 24% and 12% in Germany). Considering the economy as 
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a whole, it appears that the learning model has lost ground in both countries, in Germany to 
the lean, and in Britain to the taylor model. 
 
A closer comparison of industry and services shows that the decline in coverage of the 
learning model in Germany has been a feature of service, but not of industrial employment. In 
German manufacturing, the learning model has progressed slowly since 2000, as has the 
taylor model. In Britain, the learning model has lost ground to the lean and taylor models, 
with the lean model maintaining its dominance over other types of work systems. Thus if we 
allow for the ripple effects of Reunification on the 1995 results for Germany, it seems that the 
modernisation of work systems has taken the form of the more managerially controlled lean 
model in Britain, whereas in Germany, it has if anything given more weight to the learning 
model. In the next two sections, I should like to outline a model of task flexibility and on-the-
job learning in order to explain why industrial firms in Germany should have continued to 
work with labour institutions much more than those in services. 
 
Take in Table 1 Distribution of work systems by sector in Germany and the UK 1995-2010 
 
4. Skill and knowledge assets, work systems, and their institutional supports 
As is well-known, the flexibility of the employment relationship is founded on an 'incomplete 
contract', that is, for an agreed wage, workers consent to their employers determining the 
specific tasks to be undertaken after hiring, by managerial authority. Such flexibility is of 
great value to the employer because it enables adaptation to variable organisational demands 
in the knowledge that the necessary labour will be available, and without the need to negotiate 
over each new task. In practice, most jobs have a core of regular tasks, but they also comprise 
a number of related tasks which provide greater adaptability, and by their nature are harder to 
predict.
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 These related tasks, in particular, also provide opportunities for workplace problem-
solving, and if workers are involved in this process, they may form the basis of dynamic on-
the-job learning (Kern and Schumann, 1984, Koike and Inoki, 1990, de Dreu et al. 2003, 
Teece and Pisano, 1994). Although the economic theory of the employment relationship 
usually assumes that management simply directs workers to perform the tasks it assigns, what 
might be called the 'strong right to manage' model
14
, in practice, the more skilled workers are 
and the more they can supplement their skills with on-the-job learning, the greater the benefits 
to management of delegating task assignment to individual or teams of workers. Indeed, as 
will be seen later, the strong right to manage is really only practical for unskilled and routine 
jobs. 
 
Delegating task assignment to workers entails certain risks for management and so requires 
goodwill on both sides. The nature of such risks can be explored in more detail by means of a 
bargaining model pioneered by Simon (1951).
15
 It rests on the idea that there is a range of 
tasks at particular wage rates that are potentially both profitable for the employer and 
acceptable to the worker. Within this, they agree a wage, and a set of tasks that make up the 
employee's job. It is often assumed that this relationship can function on the basis of a strong 
'right to manage' whereby management simply instructs which tasks workers should 
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undertake. For example, in his classic account, Barnard (1938: 169) describes this set of 
mutually agreed tasks as a 'zone of indifference' for the worker. However, if the tasks differ in 
their value, then the smooth operation of the relationship will depend upon goodwill 
cooperation. This can be seen in Figure 4. The area of potential agreement over the scope of a 
job is shown by the overlap between the break-even satisfaction curves of the employer and 
the worker. Curve Sf0 shows the employer's break-even contour, below which it makes 
positive and increasing levels of profit as we move towards Sf1, and to the origin.
16
 For the 
worker, curve Sw0 shows her break-even contour, above which she is increasingly interested 
in a job with the employer as we move north-east towards the higher contour, Sw1.
17
 In the 
figure, wages increase up the vertical axis, and profits increase as one moves towards the 
origin (higher wages mean lower profits). Along the horizontal axis, tasks are ranked 
according to some characteristic of interest to both parties, such as skill level or problem-
solving demands. This is kept simple so it can be shown in a two-dimensional diagram. The 
two parties then agree a wage, WA, that compensates the future employee for the range of 
tasks she expects to have to undertake, and enables the employer to cover its labour needs and 
make a profit. Thus, the 'zone of acceptance', that is the set of tasks for a given rate of pay 
over which an employee agrees to accept management's authority in assigning work, lies 
where the agreed wage, WA, crosses Sw0 and Sf0, and so encompasses the tasks that lie 
between points A and B on the x-axis. The operation of this flexibility is most effective when 
there is goodwill on both sides, and it is undertaken in a spirit that seeks to maximise their 
joint well-being. 
 
However, such cooperation is subject to two types of 'breach', which infringe the spirit of joint 
maximisation. First, this can arise because the tasks within the zone of acceptance differ in 
their values for each party. For example, at wage WA, the tasks to the left of the zone of 
acceptance, near point A, are more profitable for the employer than those close to point B. For 
the worker, the tasks near B yield the greatest satisfaction at that wage rate. Such differences 
in the valuation of tasks within jobs are common in many organisations, and can be a constant 
source of tension, even though for both parties the tasks lie within the zone of acceptance. 
Thus one or other party could be tempted to focus on the tasks of greatest value to itself, 
irrespective of the satisfaction of the other party. One might think of this as 'cherry picking' 
the tasks of greatest benefit to oneself. At the agreed wage, the employer would be better off 
by imposing more profitable tasks, and the employee, by selecting the more interesting tasks. 
A second type of conflict may emerge should one party seek to impose tasks from outside the 
zone of acceptance, if for example investments in on-the-job learning make it more costly for 
one party than the other to terminate the relationship. Thus the employer might impose more 
routine tasks, or the employee might refuse to undertake such tasks and insist on more skill-
enhancing problem-solving tasks than was understood in the original agreement. Scope for 
both types of breach becomes more open, the greater the extent to which management departs 
from the strong right to manage by delegating greater task discretion to employees. 
 
Take in Figure 4 Flexible task assignments within the zone of acceptance 
 
10 
Such conflicts can play out in a number of ways, all of which potentially undermine flexibility 
and the willingness to engage in problem-solving tasks. The parties may haggle over work 
assignments, which may be costly in terms of lost production time, but by remaining within 
the area of potential agreement, neither side pushes the other to the point of termination. 
Alternatively, one might take advantage of the difficulty the other faces to find a replacement 
job or employee, and threaten termination in order to push the other party outside its zone of 
acceptance. These are sometimes referred to as 'Dove' and 'Hawk' strategies respectively. 
Both can be destructive of cooperation as they both send a signal to the other party that its 
partner is no longer seeking the joint benefit. Game theorists show that the best strategy, 
sometimes called 'Bourgeois', is to cooperate but be prepared to punish breaches should they 
occur. Its success requires that expected costs of sanctions facing the party in breach should 
exceed its expected gains, and that the offended party should always be ready to punish 
breaches if necessary (Maynard Smith, 1982, Bowles, 2004, Gibbons and Henderson, 2012).
18
 
Following this line of argument, one can see that the greater the loss of benefit from foregone 
cooperation compared with the immediate gain from breach, the stronger the incentive for 
continued cooperation,  which can then give rise to a virtuous circle comprising further on-
the-job learning and growing mutual benefits. 
 
In the case of the employment relationship, because of its open-ended nature and reliance on 
tacit understandings, this potentially neat solution encounters a number of difficulties. First, 
one of the parties may be slow to detect breach, and the longer that endures the greater the 
potential gains. Second, one or other party's valuation of future cooperation may change, and 
if it were to diminish (and its discount rate to rise), the longer it would be before the 
discounted long-term costs of lost cooperation exceed the short-term gains from breach, if 
ever. Yet early detection of breach is often difficult on account of the uncodified nature of 
task assignments within the zone of acceptance, and the variable frequency with which they 
occur. Repetition, and therefore time, is always needed to assess changes in the frequency, for 
example, of unfavourable assignments, because they cannot be inferred from a single 
occurrence. . Of course, such changes may occur also for reasons that reflect joint benefits, 
such as in response to changes in product market conditions. It  becomes difficult therefore to 
distinguish adverse changes proposed in bad faith from those made in good faith.
19
 In the 
German context, for its proponents, one of the strengths of German 'diversified quality 
production' was that employees could work flexibly within broad jobs because they had 
'redundant skills' not required by their normal workloads, but which could be called upon to 
deal with unusual tasks (Sorge and Streeck, 1988). A major change in profitability, such as 
occurred in the early 1990s, would make such tasks and skills too expensive. However, for the 
employees, it is often not clear whether the changed pattern of work is in the joint interest, or 
simply the result of their employer's desire to raise profits, and hence whether they should 
cooperate or punish. A third factor that may inhibit punishing breaches relates to asymmetries 
in net conflict costs, as the party facing the higher costs may be reluctant to act. Writing about 
enforcement of norms of exchange, Stinchcombe (1986: ch12) evokes the 'principle of lesser 
interest': the party with the least to lose has the upper hand. Usually, employers find it easier 
than workers to spread the risks of loss of income as a result of punishing breach because they 
can reassign work between their remaining employees, and adapt production schedules, 
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especially in medium and large firms. High local unemployment, or recruitment difficulties, 
could also reduce the respective willingness of employees or employers to punish breaches. 
All of these factors, by weakening the ability to punish breach, can undermine the willingness 
of the parties to engage in flexible jobs and learning for fear of exploitation by the other. 
 
How can the parties respond to these problems? Voice channels are considered in the next 
section, but, within the logic of Figure 4, it is worth considering the 'individual' solution that 
involves only the actors immediately concerned, as that reflects the logic of the game 
theoretic pay-offs discussed earlier. This solution to potential breaches of goodwill seeks to 
limit potential gains by narrowing the zone of acceptance. Thus, employers and employees 
might seek to segment the zone of acceptance into a series of more narrowly defined jobs. 
This has a number of advantages for the more vulnerable party. Considering Figure 4, 
dividing the former zone of acceptance into two or more separate jobs has a number of 
effects. It reduces both the scope for cherry picking and its potential gains owing to the 
smaller variation in task values to either party within them. Narrow jobs also make it easier to 
detect and punish breach  more quickly. Because they require only narrow, firm-specific, 
skills that can be learned more quickly, finding replacement workers or jobs is easier, thus 
reducing the potential cost and difficulty of punishing breach. Thus, compared with work 
systems based on broad flexible jobs, those based on narrow jobs can be more robust, and 
more resistant to attempts to play hawk or dove. However, this is achieved at the cost of 
reduced task flexibility, and reduced opportunities for dynamic on-the-job learning: a move 
away from the learning and towards the lean and taylor models. Such loss of flexibility need 
not occur all at once, but it may come about progressively over time as tasks whose 
acceptance would formerly have been expected automatically become problematic.  
 
The importance of symmetry is illustrated in Figure 5. The axes show, for each party, the 
expected net benefits from cooperation over future periods that are put at risk by breach 
compared with the potential gains in the current period. Higher ratios reflect greater 
investments in firm-specific skills and knowledge, such as result from on-the-job problem-
solving and learning. The 45 degree line shows where these are symmetrical between the 
parties, and where the systems are most robust because both are equally ready to punish 
breaches. A displacement from this represents a disadvantage to the party with the higher 
ratio, reflecting Stinchcombe’s principle of lesser interest, and if it persists, that party would 
be more secure by moving to a lower level, for example, by retreating to narrower jobs with 
more specific task obligations.
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 When the ratio falls below unity, net gains from breach 
exceed punishment costs, so the temptation to play Hawk or Dove is too great for a viable 
employment relationship, and a sales contract which specifies task obligations in advance will 
be preferred. The figure illustrates how the retreat from flexible working need not be sudden 
and dramatic. It is more likely to emerge as the quality of cooperation degrades, and workers 
disengage from the additional activities related to their jobs, in a process analogous to method 
drift under incentive pay systems (Schmiede and Schudlich, 1976). Active use of voice 
channels provides an alternative solution. 
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Take in Figure 5 Tipping points and feasible contract models under different conflict cost 
conditions 
5. Employee voice and the stability of cooperation 
One of the most important institutional stabilisers is the provision of voice channels that 
enable the parties to explain the reasons for change, and in the process come to understand 
better the actions required to promote joint benefit within the employment relationship. It can 
also facilitate adaptation to new conditions and, if needed, renegotiation of the initial 
agreement. It can also provide a critical intermediate step in dispute resolution between the 
initial perception of breach and the use of sanctions. In particular, it enables both parties to 
explain the reasons for certain assignments, which can then be assessed for their 
reasonableness or otherwise. This is particularly important given the often ambiguous nature 
of breach discussed previously.  
 
Voice can take both individual and collective forms, and in recent years, there has been 
growing interest in the role of individual voice in adapting the demands of individual workers' 
jobs. Rousseau (2005), for example, has coined the expression 'i-deals', which enable 
individual employees to negotiate adaptations of work roles and other terms of their 
employment with their managers. It has been common to think of individual and collective 
voice as rival channels because the former may induce employees with more marketable skills 
and abilities to seek individual solutions, and so detract from solidaristic ones. However, a 
recent study of individual and collective voice in France and Great Britain found that this 
rivalry hinged upon whether collective voice depended on the ability to mobilise support, or 
whether it existed as of right (Marsden, 2013). In the latter case, collective and individual 
voice could operate as complements. This is relevant to Germany because the statutory 
collective channels in France comprise works councils and statutory-based workplace 
delegates, with strong similarities to those in Germany. In that study, it appeared that the 
statutory voice channels were often used when workers could not get satisfaction from 
individual dealing with their managers. This is doubly significant in the light of the previous 
discussion of task assignments within the employment relationship. First, it provides a degree 
of additional protection for individual workers from unfair pressure from managers, and 
second, it can be used to discourage opportunistic action by individual workers that might be 
damaging to co-workers, and to the working relationship between employee representatives 
and managers. 
 
Considering the four types of work systems, it is reasonable to suppose that the greater the 
degree of worker skill and task discretion the greater the potential benefit from both 
individual and collective voice. High levels of skill coupled with  high levels of problem-
solving and on-the-job learning activities, as postulated in Koike’s (1997) theory of broad 
skills, make the learning model inherently harder to operate than the other systems. The 
resulting skills mean that the workers are expensive for the firm to replace, but as many of the 
acquired skills are firm-specific, finding suitable alternative jobs is also difficult. At the same 
time, the flexible task assignments and high degrees of task discretion, required for effective 
problem-solving, create the greatest scope for cherry picking of tasks by both parties.
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threat of quits and dismissals can make individual voice expensive to operate, hence, in this 
kind of work, individual voice can benefit from non-rival statutory forms of workplace voice, 
such as works councils and their workplace representatives. As the employer also has a strong 
stake in on-the-job learning, it too can benefit from effective employee voice, not only to 
minimise the use of quits and dismissals, but also to avoid the risk of a downward drift in 
cooperation. In contrast, in low-skill, low-discretion work systems, such as the taylor model, 
the right to manage is more strongly applied – workers have less task discretion – and jobs are 
narrower and more standardised so there is less reliance on goodwill cooperation.  
 
Employee voice also plays an important role in the regulation of individual and collective 
dismissals, for example in establishing notice periods, and procedures for review. As argued 
earlier, employers often have a bargaining advantage because they better able to spread the 
cost of sanctions than can employees, and they can also more easily spread the cost of short-
term labour market fluctuations. Thus, the threat of dismissal is often more potent than that of 
quitting. This vulnerability can make employees more reluctant to share investments in skills 
and in job flexibility. Whereas it is difficult for an employer, on an entirely individual basis, 
to make a credible commitment to respect these joint investments, this can be done against a 
background of independently binding procedures, such as those set in law or in collective 
agreements. Thus procedures that confine the right to dismiss to demonstrating good cause, 
and which provide for notice periods and consultation, can provide the assurance necessary 
for employees to be willing to invest in such skills and to work flexibly. Likewise, employee 
voice in workplace training can help to ensure that it is conducted in a spirit of joint interest. 
As German apprenticeships, both blue and white collar, frequently involve joint investments 
by employer and employee, and especially in larger, and more technically advanced firms, it 
is important that both parties are confident in its quality and in the prospects for a return on 
their respective investment (Dustmann and Schoenberg, 2008). This would explain why 
employees look to works councils to protect their return on investments in skill and flexibility 
(Jirjahn, 2009). It is therefore significant that the 2005 reforms of the German apprenticeship 
system reaffirmed its co-management by state, employer groups and workers, notably through 
their works councils (BiBB, 2014). All of these factors can reinforce the cooperation strategy 
which underpins the learning model. By facilitating exchange of information, voice channels 
make it easier to identify breach, and distinguish it from changes in job demands made in 
good faith. Employment protection rules and transferable skills help to protect especially 
employees against fluctuations in their individual bargaining power so that they can be more 
confident that their interests will be respected by their employers. The possession of 
transferable skills reduces vulnerability to unemployment, but it also provides a high common 
platform for additional workplace skills. As these factors develop, whether on the basis of 
collective or individual bargaining power, they provide an alternative to cooperation on the 
basis of narrow jobs. Finally, the institutions themselves take time to win the confidence of 
the parties both as concerns their effectiveness and their trustworthiness. Jirjahn et al. (2011) 
found that mutual confidence between management and works councils takes time to develop. 
This should not be surprising as employee representatives have to find common ground with 
management while maintaining their credibility with their constituents, which takes time. 
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Knowing this, employers would seek to maintain such relationships when they need their 
support for learning types of work systems. 
 
6. Institutional change and prospects 
The question at the start of this article asked whether, under pressure from global economic 
changes, Germany's industrial relations system is evolving towards a neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon 
model with a strong right to manage, and a diminishing role for independent labour 
representation, or whether, despite current changes, it retains its own distinctive path. To an 
outside observer, despite its recent changes, a notable feature of the German industrial 
relations system has been its ability to adapt to different economic circumstances, both over 
time, but also between workplaces operating different types of work systems. Broadly 
speaking, the same legal rights to codetermination and union bargaining are available to all 
workers, whatever the nature of their work systems, and they have continued to apply to 
sectors as they have adapted to new technologies, and moved from one predominant work 
system to another, from taylorism to lean and diversified quality production (Kern and 
Schuman, 1984, Jürgens et al., 1993). Moreover, it has allowed the key actors to operate with 
different strategies at different times. As Haipeter (2012) shows, although outside observers 
widely use the concept of 'social partnership' to describe the German model, the unions 
themselves are ambivalent about using the term. Indeed, Müller-Jentsch, who has long 
worked closely with the unions, proposed the alternative term 'conflict partnership'. Indeed, 
this diversity of strategies is long-standing. The contrast between the organisational 
descendants of the unions that Bergmann et al (1975) used to illustrate the 'cooperative' and 
'conflictual' strategies in the 1970s remains pertinent today. Works council strategies also vary 
considerably from one firm to another, as Kotthoff (2013) emphasises. Sometimes this may 
be due to the economic situation, but it can also be affected by their long-term experience of 
dealing with management, as shown by Jirjahn et al (2011). Thus, one of the long-standing 
strengths of the German system has been its adaptability, although much of the current debate 
in Germany focuses on whether its limits have been reached.  
 
In the 1990s, Ronald Dore (1996) anticipated the current debate about segmentation when he 
asked whether the German model was moving from a system of class to one of enterprise 
representation: from an inclusive system seeking to represent all workers to one focusing on 
those in the same enterprise. Apart from the then shifting focus of wage bargaining, Dore also 
foresaw the impact of the increasing supplementation of occupational skills with firm-specific 
training. The latter observation highlights a very important feature of the learning model, 
which extends beyond the workplace, to the relationship between the three key actors in the 
modern firm: workers, managers and investors. In his remarkable Clarendon Lectures, Aoki 
(2010) considers how the development of the learning model alters the balance within this 
three-way relationship. The base point of his analysis is the hierarchical model of nested 
principal-agent relationships used in his ideal-typical representation of the Anglo-Saxon 
shareholder firm, the A-firm. In the A-firm, investors provide the physical assets, managers 
their technical knowledge and expertise in coordination, and workers, their human capital 
skills. Aoki considers the economic balance within this model as the outcome of a three-way 
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bargain: how can the three types of actors collaborate in a potentially beneficial productive 
enterprise while ensuring that each receives its share of the benefits. Each party can ensure its 
return on the physical, knowledge and skill assets it contributes by the threat of withdrawal, or 
'exit'. For this to apply, the parties must have viable outside options which requires that their 
respective assets be separable. Each must be able to redeploy its assets elsewhere at an 
equivalent level of productivity. Thus workers and managers, for example, should be able to 
work as effectively with other teams of workers and managers in other organisations.
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The learning model changes this balance because incumbent workers acquire knowledge and 
skills that are specific to their current employer, and when fully developed by a process of 
joint problem-solving and learning by small groups of workers and managers, then the 
knowledge and skill assets of workers and managers become progressively more intertwined, 
and less separable. In the strong case of the learning model, Aoki argues that their assets may 
become 'fused'. As a result, both workers and managers depend more heavily on mutual 
goodwill, but also, this interdependence creates a shared interest between them, and makes it 
harder for the third party, investors, to discipline managers and through them, the workers. 
Thus the disciplines of the hierarchical A-firm model are eroded, and alternative mechanisms 
for ensuring productive collaboration are needed. Aoki identified one model as the archetypal 
Japanese firm, the J-firm, and another, in his lectures, as the archetypal full codetermination 
German firm, the G-firm. In these, different managerial disciplines apply than in the A-firm, 
ones that are more suited to the learning model. In particular, both the J- and G-firms involve 
high degrees of participation by all three parties in the governance of the firm. The learning 
model brings specific risks for each of the parties. Exit is more difficult for investors once 
their resources are committed because they risk forfeiting the higher returns of high 
productivity labour. Likewise, managers and workers have skills and knowledge that are less 
readily deployed to other organisations; and the more flexible and adaptive job boundaries 
deprive workers of protection against arbitrary extension of their work roles discussed in 
Section 3 above. They also involve the risks of diluting the transferability of their 
occupational skills by supplementing them with firm-specific skills. For all parties, shared 
skill and knowledge assets make use of the outside option much harder to apply than in the 
hierarchical A-firm, and so necessitate alternative governance mechanisms. 
 
Supervisory boards on which both labour and shareholder representatives are present provide 
a formal institution equivalent to the more informal channels applied in the governance of the 
archetypal J-firm. Works councils provide a formal channel for worker-management joint 
decision-making on key issues. In similar vein, participation in inter-firm labour and 
employer organisations provides channels of influence and information that can support 
goodwill relationships in the workplace, such as those needed to underpin the learning model. 
For the future of the German model, Aoki's argument implies segmentation in the form of 
maintenance of the codetermination model in Germany in sectors where the learning model is 
needed for economic success, and potential erosion elsewhere.  
 
As is clear from the data on work systems, many firms in Germany operate alternatives to the 
learning model. According to the argument of this paper, it is in firms using these systems that 
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conditions are more likely to lead to the emergence of a weakly regulated segment with 
poorer conditions of pay and employment. Eichhorst (2014) has shown that, since the Hartz 
reforms, temporary and agency working has grown most in services and in routine and low-
skilled jobs. EWCS data confirm for Germany that use of agency and fixed term contracts has 
progressed most among employees working in taylorist systems, and least among those in the 
learning model.
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 Even within the high-skill sectors there has also been a modest increase in 
the use of agency labour especially for routine administrative and low-skilled jobs. The role 
of works councils in negotiating such changes is illustrated by some of the cases cited by 
Kotthoff (2013), where changes have been agreed in order to help the employer improve its 
cost competitiveness, and to protect the skills of its core workers. If the argument of this paper 
is right, it suggests that behind the diversity of work systems among German firms lie the skill 
and knowledge requirements for operating in different product markets. Thus, the firms that 
derive greatest benefit from the model's governance mechanisms seek to retain and reform its 
structures, whereas those that derive less benefit seek to reduce its cost and if necessary to opt 
out. 
 
Nevertheless, even firms that do not practice the learning model face risks when 
contemplating use of the opt-out path. Institutional retreat does not necessarily mean that 
workers have lost all their individual and small group bargaining power. One important 
feature of the German model has been the separation of bargaining over pay from that of 
agreeing work assignments. Despite union decline in Britain, and despite the reassertion of 
the right to manage, in many British firms, the same job level negotiation between workers 
and their immediate managers persists (eg. Knights and McCabe, 2000).
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 Often, the 
associated conflict is more akin to the prolonged haggling associated with Dove rather than 
Hawk conflicts yet these reduce productivity and erode goodwill. Taking a longer term 
perspective, arguably, such daily low-level workplace conflict contributed much to the low 
productivity and decline of the British engineering industry in the 1960s to the 1980s and was 
prominent in the thinking of Britain's Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' 
Associations (1968). With a background of strong labour demand and low unemployment 
until the mid-1970s, treating wage bargaining and work organisation issues through a single 
channel of representation meant that daily task assignments became the subject of frequent 
negotiation between line managers and work groups. The individual 'i-deals' explored by 
Rousseau (2005) potentially pose similar problems. To a degree, in contrast to what Coase 
(1937) had argued, the employment contract ceases to substitute a single bargain for myriad 
of open-market negotiations: instead, it becomes the first of a myriad of small bargains within 
the firm that follow hiring. Since that period, firms in Britain have largely re-established 
control over the work process, but they have often done so by ensuring that workers remain 
easily substitutable so that the dismissal threat remains credible, on the lines of the A-firm. 
Arguably, this has a price in terms of the potential knowledge and skill assets forgone in order 
to maintain this state of affairs, and has constrained British firms to adopt the lean rather than 
the learning model when modernising their work organisation (Keep and Mayhew, 1998). 
 
In contrast, Germany's dual system largely avoided this outcome by separating responsibility 
for wage bargaining from that for workplace issues, and assigning these respectively to unions 
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and works councils. Line managers could not use pay as a resource to get employees to accept 
task assignments, and individual employees and work groups could not make their acceptance 
conditional upon doing a deal with their manager. By dividing areas of employee influence in 
this way, the German system has been able to provide both sufficient voice to support 
cooperation while at the same time making it harder to use strength in one area to support 
demands in another.
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 This partitioning is jeopardised by the erosion of the coverage and 
'spill-over' effects of collective agreements. 
 
This article has proposed that the decline in coverage of the German model of industrial 
relations reflects an increasing alignment between the type of work systems that firms operate 
and their institutional needs for stable cooperation. The learning model, which it has been 
argued is important for Germany's high performance manufacturing, has sustained employer 
interest in the benefits they derive from a strong pattern of representation. In contrast, in other 
sectors, such as in many services and smaller firms, using different work systems, employer 
perceived benefit and engagement has declined, hence the institutional retreat. More detailed 
empirical work would be needed to establish this argument with greater confidence, notably 
to document the hypothesised link between the learning model, institutional support, and 
economic performance which is not possible on the basis of the EWCS. There should also be 
some caution in estimating the extent of decline because of the need to choose a base period 
for comparison. Often that base period has reflected the peaks of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, which coincided with the end of the period of rapid inflation. At that time, workers 
needed unions to defend their relative pay, and employers needed the protection of wage 
agreements negotiated by their employers' associations. At that time also, one common 
concern, defending living standards, tended to drive out other more differentiated concerns in 
the workplace. Thus part of today's 'segmentalism' may reflect the unwinding of institutional 
patterns that were developed during the fight against the common enemy of inflation. The 
time lag may seem long, but other economic institutions, such as those of European monetary 
policy, also continue to bear the imprint of the 1970s inflation.  
 
Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of a short article, segmentalism poses three 
serious problems for German industrial relations, and for German society more generally. The 
first concerns the question raised by the codetermination commission which emphasised that 
workplace representation is also a form of industrial democracy from which workers in firms 
without collective representation are excluded. In view of the wage disadvantage of workers 
in establishments outside collective agreements (Addison et al, 2012), it seems doubtful that 
lower-paid workers have been able to substitute individual for collective voice.  The second 
concerns how far segmentalism can go before it undermines social cohesion and political 
stability. Sinn (2006) cites competitor hourly wages that are as little as 13% of those in 
Germany when he urges greater wage flexibility to boost employment. Wage flexibility of 
such magnitude would take some German wages well below international definitions for 
poverty within a country. Thirdly, there must be concern for the long-term stability of the 
slimmed down codetermination model, and its greater reliance on the self-interest of 
individual firms, and their supply chain partners. Market fortunes and technologies change, 
and can do so abruptly, so that the short-run profitability of a particular type of work system 
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for individual firms can shift. Streeck (2009) emphasised how the classical German model 
embodied a number of mechanisms for sharing firms' and workers' economic risks and 
adjustment costs more widely, with other firms, other workers and with the state. It might be 
harder to preserve the learning model without such mechanisms as it would force firms to 
adjust to economic shocks more rapidly, and potentially strain relationships of mutual trust.   
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1
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German Model', IAB, Nürnberg, February 13-14 2014, and especially, Guglielmo Meardi for extensive and 
thorough comments, as well as, the editors, and three anonymous referees. This paper draws on work in progress 
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as part of a more extensive study of work systems and the employment relationship. The author acknowledges 
also Eurofound for the use of the European Working Conditions Survey. 
 
2
 See Section 3 below, which explains the four models of work systems used in this article. 
 
3
 Between 1990 and 2003, German GDP in constant prices grew by 23% compared with 47% and 48% 
respectively in the UK and the US (OECD Statextracts: GDP, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, reference 
year 2005). 
 
4
 See EIRonline New collective agreements signed in metalworking:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/03/feature/de0403203f.htm  
 
5
 I shall use the term 'German' firms as a short-hand to refer to firms locating their productive activities in 
Germany, and similarly for Britain. This clarification is necessary because of the increasing tendency for firms to 
organise production along global supply chains whose links are located in many different countries. 
 
6
 IAB panel data for workplaces with >5 employees. 
 
7
 Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) workplaces with >=25 employees. 
 
8
 The decline in coverage may overstate the loss of influence of collective agreements as substantial numbers of 
non-covered firms follow these agreements.  
 
9
 Formal rules of employment protection may of course be applied with greater or lesser strictness at workplace 
level, and one should bear in mind that those measured by the OECD relate to procedures, and not to levels of 
dismissals (OECD 2013: ch 2).  
 
10
 A potential downside to this process has been highlighted in a thought provoking article by Sinn (2006). He 
argues that that Germany's export performance gives a misleading impression of the overall health of the 
economy, and that this participation in international supply chains has had an adverse effect on employment in 
other activities in Germany in which labour has become relatively overpriced compared with international 
competitors.  
 
11
 The EWCS is a household survey of workers across the EU which enquires about the nature of their work, 
their working conditions and health, qualifications, and some measures of the HR practices in their workplaces. 
The survey is designed to be representative at the national level, but the sample is large enough to provide some 
differentiation within countries, for example by major sector or occupation. 
 
12
 The work systems were regressed on information about pay systems and related practices on training and job 
tenure for 1995-2010 on which the EWCS provides information. The detail is available from the author. 
Regressions were done using the full set of EU-15 countries to overcome sample size limitations. A multinomial 
logit regression was used, taking the Taylor system as benchmark. A separate logit regression was done for that 
system to facilitate interpretation of the results. The results are broadly consistent with economic and human 
resource theories of incentive pay. The need for cooperation and team-working in the Learning and Lean systems 
is reflected in the use of collective, company-based, incentive pay. The focus on individual output in Taylorist 
systems is reflected in the use of individual payment by results, but also in pay for specific inconveniences of the 
job, such as overtime, bad conditions and unsocial hours. Because of the nature of mlogit, the coefficients need 
to be read comparatively between work systems. Likewise with regard to investments in training and on-the-job 
learning (proxied by length of service), the Learning and Lean systems emerge as the predominant users. 
Turning to workplace size and occupation, whereas use of taylorism increases steadily with establishment size, 
this is not the case for the other systems, which increasingly diverge from taylorism as size increases. In terms of 
occupations, the Learning and Lean models are associated with managerial and technical work, whereas 
taylorism is associated with blue collar and junior white collar work.  This correspondence between individual 
reports of work organisation with workplace HR policies suggests strongly that the four types can indeed be 
interpreted as work systems. The derivation of the work system models from the EWCS is explained in the 
Appendix. Detailed regressions are available from the author. 
 
13
 This concept is recognised in the US O*net classification of occupations which groups the tasks comprising 
different occupations into core and peripheral tasks (http://www.onetonline.org/ ). 
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14
 See Manning (1996).  
 
15
 Since Simon's article, this line of analysis has developed within the debate about whether union bargaining is 
best characterised by a 'right to manage' model, in which wages are negotiated but employment fixed by the 
employer, or an 'efficient bargain' model, in which both wages and employment are agreed (eg Oswald, 1985, 
Lawson, 2010). However, in this paper, the focus is on task assignments rather than employment, and in 
individual workers rather than unions. Thus, a strong 'right-to-manage' model would imply management 
dictating employee task assignments whereas the efficient bargain model would imply allowing a degree of 
employee discretion over tasks within an overall need to meet production and cost targets. 
 
16
 Conventionally, in wage-employment decisions in competitive conditions, the shape of the employers' profit 
curve is an inverted 'U', with its maximum intersecting the labour demand curve. Given fixed capital equipment, 
hiring additional labour at first leads to increased net revenues, but after a certain level, diminishing returns set 
in. In the context of tasks rather than employees, one could envisage an analogous process. For example, 
assuming a worker with a given type of skill and capability, if tasks increase in their skill demands, changing 
from the routine towards those incorporating more problem-solving demands, then productivity and profits 
increase initially as worker interest increases, but beyond a certain point, greater job demands lead to more 
mistakes and declining productivity. In a formal presentation, Simon (1951) observes that one may consider 
several different types of tasks, although they could not be shown in a two-dimensional chart. In the union 
bargaining model, the employer's profit curve is additionally affected by the declining sales price as output 
increases, following the downward sloping product demand curve, see for example Cartter (1959: Ch. 8), 
McDonald and Solow (1981), and Oswald (1985) in the analysis of optimal contracts in union-employer 
negotiations. See also Marsden (1999) Chapter 1. 
 
17
 For the worker, it can be shown that various mixes of tasks of different types are compatible with the same 
level of profit for the firm provided their shadow prices adjust. For example, if one were to imagine the firm as 
requiring a mix of routine and problem-solving tasks, and that these are to a degree substitutes in production, 
then provided employees' shadow prices for each type of task are adaptable to the task mix, it can be shown that 
for the same monthly wage, different mixes of tasks are compatible with the same level of profits for the firm. 
Thus for the same weekly wage (and profit) the worker could undertake a higher proportion of problem-solving 
tasks if she were willing to accept a lower shadow, or implicit, price for them than for routine tasks, and vice 
versa.  
 
18
 Maynard Smith and Bowles illustrate this for single move games, and Gibbons and Henderson show how it 
can work in repeated games.  
 
19
 For example, in Figure 4, a long-term fall in profitability can lead to a downward shift of the profit curves, so 
that Sf0 becomes Sf1. Because of the changed economic circumstances, some of the tasks situated to the right of 
the zone of acceptance, close to point B, become redundant for the employer. If this is caused by an external 
change, then it is probably in the joint interest of both parties to make adjustments, but the employee lacks 
reliable information to determine whether this is genuine. 
 
20
 Crozier (1963) argues that work rules become restrictive in order to protect the weaker party.  
 
21
 For example, in their study of work hours in US law firms, Landers et al, (1996) show how promotion 
tournaments encourage associates to work very long hours despite the relatively high degree of discretion in their 
work. 
 
22
 Of course, firm-specific skills have played an important part in thinking about internal labour markets in the 
US. However, a critical difference with the learning model is that those skills had developed primarily within a 
taylorist model of organisation in which management determined the content and scope of jobs that workers 
undertook. In doing so, they also restricted the scope of learning opportunities on the job (Doeringer and Piore, 
1971, Koike and Inoki, 1990). 
 
23
 Detailed results are available on request from the author.  
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24
 Indeed, Hugh Clegg (1972) built his theory of the British industrial relations system up from the bottom, 
starting with an analysis of the work group. This is in sharp contrast to Dunlop's approach which focused on 
rule-making by organised actors representing labour, employers and the state.  
 
25
 These ideas were developed more fully in a study of the use of separate zones of operation for different 
workplace institutions gives workers voice while still protecting employers' interests by stabilising the 
distribution of control (Marsden 1978). Empirical corroboration for this division of responsibilities can be found 
in Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) in which they show that works councils in firms that are covered by a collective pay 
agreement increase productivity but not wages, whereas those in firms without a collective agreement raise 
wages. 
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9. Tables and Figures  
 
 
Table 1 Distribution of work systems by sector in Germany and the UK 1995-2010 
 Learning  Lean  Taylor  
Craft/  
simple   
Whole economy 3  2  1  4   
DE Share % SE Share % SE Share % SE Share SE N 
1995 48.8 1.6 21.1 1.3 11.5 0.9 18.6 1.2 1613 
2000 45.4 1.6 21.0 1.3 11.2 1.0 22.4 1.3 1266 
2005 39.3 2.0 25.4 1.8 13.7 1.5 21.6 1.6 863 
2010 41.0 1.4 27.0 1.2 12.6 0.9 19.3 1.0 1801 
All years 44.0 0.8 23.7 0.7 12.1 0.5 20.2 0.6 5543 
UK          
1995 35.7 1.9 40.7 1.9 13.3 1.3 10.2 1.1 863 
2000 33.6 1.7 38.2 1.7 13.7 1.1 14.6 1.2 1226 
2005 28.3 1.8 36.5 1.9 15.5 1.4 19.7 1.6 823 
2010 29.0 1.5 37.7 1.5 16.9 1.2 16.4 1.2 1251 
All years 31.6 0.9 38.2 0.9 14.9 0.6 15.2 0.6 4163 
          
Manufacturing          
DE          
1995 35.2 3.4 30.8 3.2 23.8 2.5 10.1 1.7 349 
2000 29.7 3.3 30.5 3.3 24.7 2.9 15.2 2.6 250 
2005 31.5 4.4 31.4 4.4 27.1 4.3 10.0 2.5 139 
2010 34.4 3.1 28.9 2.8 26.5 2.9 10.2 1.8 303 
All years 33.1 1.7 30.2 1.7 25.4 1.5 11.3 1.1 1041 
UK          
1995 31.6 4.5 42.3 4.6 19.6 3.4 6.5 2.3 132 
2000 22.8 3.9 42.5 4.5 24.3 3.7 10.4 3.1 186 
2005 21.4 4.7 46.4 5.6 22.0 4.2 10.2 3.4 108 
2010 18.6 4.3 46.3 5.4 30.3 4.9 4.9 2.1 101 
All years 24.3 2.3 43.9 2.5 23.6 2.0 8.2 1.5 527 
          
Private services          
DE          
1995 52.3 3.1 17.1 2.4 5.4 1.2 25.2 2.6 434 
2000 42.1 2.8 17.5 2.1 9.1 1.6 31.3 2.6 427 
2005 38.5 3.4 14.6 2.3 10.9 2.1 35.9 3.3 277 
2010 37.5 2.1 22.9 1.8 11.0 1.3 28.6 1.9 708 
All years 42.9 1.4 18.8 1.1 9.0 0.7 29.3 1.2 1836 
UK          
1995 32.5 3.2 39.2 3.2 15.4 2.3 12.9 2.1 307 
2000 28.0 2.5 38.0 2.6 15.9 1.8 18.1 2.0 521 
2005 25.5 3.0 32.9 3.1 19.8 2.6 21.8 2.7 306 
2010 25.2 2.4 31.4 2.4 20.8 2.1 22.5 2.0 501 
All years 27.5 1.4 35.2 1.4 18.1 1.1 19.1 1.1 1635 
Source: EWCS, weighted estimates. Employees, all firm sizes. Standard errors in % points. 
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Figure 1. Strictness of employment protection in Germany and the UK 1990-2013 
 
Source: OECD Statextracts: Strictness of employment protection: individual, collective and temporary workers. Key: 
EPL_coll, _Ind, and _temp relate respectively to collective, individual and temporary worker employment protection. 
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Figure 2 Long term jobs for selected age groups in Germany and the UK 1992-2012. 
 
 
Source: OECD Statextracts 
Notes: Current length of service (percentages of all employees with >=5 and >=10 years' service ) for selected age 
groups of female and male employees: ages 25-29, 35-39, and 25-54. Germany shown by squares and the UK by 
triangles. 
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Figure 3. Manufacturing value added and exports in Germany and the UK 1995-2008 
 
 
Source: OECD STAN Tables. Key: Mf: manufacturing; exp:  exports; GVA: gross value added; GO, gross output. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Flexible task assignments within the zone of acceptance 
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Figure 5 Tipping points and feasible contract models under different conflict cost conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Appendix  
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Derivation of the work system clusters using EWCS employee reports on the nature of their 
work. 
 
The European Working Conditions Survey is carried out by Eurofound. Details of its methodology 
and questionnaires can be found at: http://eurofound.europa.eu/working/surveys/  
 
Lorenz and Valeyre (2005) and Holm et al (2010) used the EWCS to identify common types of 
work system practiced in the economies of the European Union. They use a survey of the literature 
on new forms of work organisation to justify their categorisation of the clusters that emerge from 
their statistical analysis. Their work was subsequently taken up in Employment in Europe 2010 on 
work systems and working conditions in the EU. Appendix Table A1 lists the work organisation 
variables taken from the four waves of the EWCS for 1995-2010, and shows their mean values for 
each of the four types of work system.  
 
For the analysis in this paper, the work system clusters were identified using the full EU-15 sample 
for employees in all sectors and workplaces and pooling data for all years available. The clusters 
were derived using STATA's Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), similar to factor analysis 
for binary variables. From this two dimensions were extracted, which were then used to compute 
the work system clusters using STATA's kmeans command. 
 
Table A1 Mean values of work organisation questions by type of work system 
 
Employees report that their job  
involves the following: 
EWCS 
question 
no in 
2010 Learning Lean Taylor 
Craft/  
simple 
      
Job involves learning new things q49f 0.903 0.910 0.403 0.316 
Job involves solving unforeseen problems on my own q49c 0.965 0.948 0.562 0.487 
Assess quality of own work q49b 0.829 0.922 0.595 0.310 
Teamwork q56 0.598 0.795 0.656 0.343 
Rotation of tasks q53 0.429 0.690 0.533 0.263 
Complex tasks q49e 0.749 0.789 0.320 0.183 
Autonomy over methods q50b 0.910 0.746 0.137 0.448 
Autonomy over speed q50c 0.867 0.714 0.216 0.494 
Repetitive work (1 min cycles) q44a 0.052 0.467 0.582 0.165 
Repetitive work (10 min cycles) q44b 0.179 0.688 0.787 0.296 
Monotonous q49d 0.173 0.541 0.760 0.385 
Job involves meeting precise quality standards q49a 0.691 0.928 0.849 0.384 
Pace of work dependent on machine speed or product movement q46d 0.020 0.346 0.597 0.048 
Pace of work dependent on direct control of boss q46e 0.196 0.538 0.695 0.289 
Pace of work dependent on work done by colleagues q46a 0.341 0.726 0.700 0.232 
Pace of work dependent on numerical production / performance 
targets 
q46c 
0.243 0.606 0.630 0.131 
kmeans cluster number  3 2 1 4 
Notes: Based on employees in all sectors in workplaces with 1 or more employees (kgroups4) EU-15 countries. 
Weighted estimates.  
Mean values, for each work system, of binary (0 1) variables based on survey responses. 
Source: EWCS 1995-2010 
